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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
'7 
I 
This case comes to the Court upon plaintiff's petition 
for an intermediate appeal. Stated generally, the problem 
is one of construing the statute which forms the basis for 
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the creation of the state park known as the "This Is The 
Place" Monument. The present appeal is one phase of the 
suit to condemn the park lands brought against a number 
of land-owners whose separate claims for just compensa-
tion have been litigated or settled one by one. 
Among these separate claims is that presented herein 
by defendant. The theory is that, in law, damage was done 
to land lying entirely outside park boundaries because, it 
is said, the legal effect of the statute creating the park was 
the closure of Kennedy Drive, a road passing through the 
park which is the only connection of defendant's land with 
the state highway. The trial court adopted defendant's 
theory. It is the correctness of that basic ruling that is 
challenged here. 
The parties to the appeal are referred to in this brief 
as they were in the proceedings below. A map .of the park 
and defendant's adjoining land, showing the course of 
Kennedy Drive, is attached at the end of the brief. Ref-
erences to the record are to the numbers stamped in red 
at the bottom of each page, .and not the reporter's type-
written numbers. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1951 the legislature passed an act authorizing the 
creation of "This Is The Place" Monument. The act, now 
Sec. 63-11-10, U. C. A. 1953, has been twice amended. The 
course of the legislation is traced below. 
At the general session, 1951, the legislature enacted 
Sec. 8, Ch. 75, Laws of Utah 1951, which read: 
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"The engineering commission is hereby granted 
the power to condemn for state park purposes any 
and all lands in the vicinity of the 'This Is the Place' 
monument as shall be deemed necessary to pre-
serve the historical significance of said monument 
and the natural beauty of the area surrounding the 
same and including all of the following described 
tract: 
"Commencing 2 rods north from the center of 
Section 11, Township 1 south, range 1 east, Salt Lake 
Meridian, and running thence West, 2,205 feet ; 
thence north 0 o 54' east 300 feet; thence north 89 o 6' 
west 437.7 feet; thence north 202.02 feet more or less 
to the Wasatch Bonneville Boulevard; thence north-
erly along said boulevard to the U. S. Military Reser-
vation; thence north 86 rods; thence .east 228 rods; 
thence south 524 feet; thence east 416 feet; thence 
south 361 feet; thence south 52° West 528 feet; 
thence northwesterly to a point 1,497 feet north 
of the point of beginning; thence south 1,497 feet to 
the place of beginning; less a tract sold to the Ameri-
can Telephone and Telegraph Company containing 
- approximately .1147 acres, and less a tract sold to 
Salt Lake City Corporation containing approximate-
ly 7.63 acres." 
An amendment to the act was passed at the first special 
session. The amended act, Sec. 1, Ch. 13, Laws of Utah 
1951, First Special Session, reads as follows: 
"The engineering commission is authorized and 
directed to forthwith condemn, in behalf of the State 
of Utah, for state park ·purposes the following de-
scribed lands: 
"a. Commencing 2 rods north from the ·center 
of Section 11, Township 1 south, range 1 east, Salt 
Lake Meridian, and running thence west 2,205 feet; 
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thence north 0°54' east 300 feet; thence north 89°06' 
west 437.7 feet; thence north 202.02 feet more or 
less to the Wasatch Bonneville Boulevard ; thence 
northerly along said boulevard to the U. S. Military 
Reservation; thence north 86 rods ; thence east 228 
rods; thence south 524 feet; thence east 416 feet; 
thence south 361 feet; thence south 52<l west 528 
feet; thence northwesterly to a point 1,497 feet 
north of the point of beginning ; thence south 1,497 
feet to the place of beginning, less a tract sold to 
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
containing approximately .1147 acres, and less a 
tract sold to Salt Lake City Corporation containing 
approximately 7.63 acres. 
"b. Any additional land in the vicinity of said 
monument, as the. engineering commission shall 
deem necessary to preserve the historical signifi-
cance of same." 
The legislature in 1953 passed S. B~ No. 86, which ex-
pressly excludes from condemnation the easement held for 
State Route 65 (which is the main highway to Henefer), 
and Kennedy Drive. The act now reads: 
"The engineering commission is authorized and 
directed to forthwith condemn, in behalf of the State 
of Utah, for state park purposes the following de-
scribed lands: 
"a. Commencing 2 rods north from the center 
of Section 11, Township 1 south, range 1 east, Salt 
Lake Meridian, and running thence west 2,205 feet; 
thence north 0°54' east 300 feet; thence north 89°06' 
west 437.7 feet; thence north 202.02 feet more or 
less to the Wasatch Bonneville Boulevard; thence 
northerly along said boulevard to the U. S. Military 
Reservation; thence north 86 rods; thence east 228 
rods; thence south 524 feet; thence east 416 feet; 
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thence south 361 feet; thence south 52 ° west 528 
feet; thence northwesterly to a point 1,497 feet 
north of the point of beginning ; thence south 1,497 
feet to the place of beginning, less a tract sold to 
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
containing approximately .1147 acres and less a 
tract sold to Salt Lake City Corporation contain-
ing approximately 7.63 acres, and less a tract 
known as Kennedy Drive, containing approxi-
mately 3.29 acres, near the south side of the above 
described tract running in a southerly and easterly 
direction from a City street to the southeast corner 
of the above described tract of land. Nothing herein 
provided shall be construed so as to require the clos-
ing or abandonment of that part of State Route 65 
which lies within the boundaries hereinabove de-
scribed, or so as to affect the present easement held 
by the State Road Commission of Utah for purposes 
of maintaining State Route 65. 
"b. Any additional land in the vicinity of said 
monument, as the engineering commission shall 
deem necessary to preserve the historical signifi-
cance of same. · 
"Section 2. This act shall take effect upon ap-
proval." 
On July 10, 1951, the Engineering Commission adopted 
a resolution instructing the Attorney General to proceed 
with condemnation of the land described in the statute (R. 
4-17). The resolution, which was incorporated into the: 
Attorney General's complaint, divided the tract into 28 
parcels held by different owners, all of whom were named 
as defendants. 
Defendant Bird & Evans, Inc., was named a party to 
the original complaint because of its ownership of Parcel 
No.7, lying within park boundaries. But it should be noted 
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that Parcel 7 is not involved here. After a trial, a jury 
made its award of $66,000 for the taking of Parcel 7 (R. 
26-27); that judgment has been paid, and the final order 
of condemnation was entered by the court as to that tract 
on March 21, 1952 (R. 29-30). The land which is the sub-
ject of this action "is an entirely separate tract lying out-
side the park; it is not Parcel 7, and is not contiguous with 
Parcel 7. 
On Aprill, 1952, the trial court permitted defendant to 
file a cross-complaint (R. 20-22). It is there alleged that 
the taking of the park lands does damage to a tract which 
lies outside park boundaries. The theory is that plaintiff, 
by the condemnation of Parcel 28, will close Kennedy Drive, 
which is described in paragraph 3 of the cross-complaint as 
"the only practical access road to" defendant's land. Al-
ternatively, it was pleaded that if Kennedy Drive were to 
remain open, damage to a lesser degree would nevertheless 
be inflicted upon defendant's land. The latter theory has 
been abandoned, however (R. 79). 
Pursuing its first theory, defendant moved to make 
parties of Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County, because the 
fee simple in Kennedy Drive was held by one or the other 
(R. 31). The motion was granted (R. 32-34) and those 
two parties appeared, the County filing a disclaimer (R. 38) 
and the City answering (R. 35-37). It appears from the 
City's unchallenged answer, and the Court knows judicial-
ly, that City boundaries now extend east sufficiently far 
to include the land in question, and that Kennedy Drive is 
a city street the fee simple to which is held by the City. 
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Two hearings before the lower court have been had on 
defendant's claim. The first hearing, on 0ctober 28, 1952, 
was devoted to oral argument upon defendant's motion to 
make co-defendants of Salt Lake City and Salt Lake Coun-
ty. A transcript of the argument was designated as part of 
the record on appeal (R. 41-66). As indicated above, de-
fendant'~ moti<;>n was granted, the trial court indicating its 
acceptance of defendant's theory that the statute itself was 
an act of condemnation and that the Engineering Commis-
sion had no discretion to leave Kennedy Drive untouched 
and uncondemned. (See particularly the trial court's re-
marks at R. 64-65.) 
The cause came on for trial on December 1, 1952. A 
jury was selected and sworn (R. 68), and then excused dur-
ing arguments on motion (R. 71). The court denied a 
motion to dismiss (R. 79) and defendant then made its 
. election as to the theory on which it intended to proceed. 
The words of counsel are : 
"MR. RAMPTON: * * * So we are electing, as 
we have to elect, to go to trial on the theory that 
Kennedy Drive is closed; that is, the right to go 
over it is taken away from us and we proceed to 
I 
trial on that theory- and ask damages on that basis." 
Plaintiff then moved to dismiss on the ground that the 
statute was not an act of condemnation and that Kennedy 
Drive remained open (R. 79). After argument the motion 
was denied (R. 90) . 
.. 
The following passages ~ave .been extracted from the 
transcript as being indicative of the ruling of· the court as 
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to the basis upon which the matter was to have been sub-
mitted. 
"THE COURT: Let's see, the motion is made to 
dismiss on the ground that the legislative act is not 
an act of condemnation? (R. 90). 
"MR. ALSTON: That is right, Your Honor . 
. "THE COURT: The motion will be denied. 
"MR. ALSTON: Having denied that motion I 
assume that the· Court has now, or will make, an 
order that the act itself is an act of condemnation. 
"THE COURT: Well, I think that would be the 
natural following of such a ruling" (R. 91). 
* * * * * 
"MR. ALSTON: May I ask Your Honor for a 
clarification as to when the order of condemnation 
is effective? Is it, is the effective date the date of 
the act or the effective date of the resolution?" (R. 
91, 92). 
* * * * * 
"THE COURT: As indicated by Mr. Rampton 
of course you have the two statutes of our state. 
"MR. ALSTON: Chapter 75 and then Chapter 
13. 
"THE COURT: Well, you have the one passing 
the legislative act condemning the property. Then 
you have the procedural act which indicates the date 
of the service of summons is the effective date of the 
condemnation. I think the law requires that I, if 
possible, give effect and force to both statutes and 
I see nothing in the 1952 session that would repeal 
our general condemnation law, that the effective 
date is the date of the service of summons. So I 
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would say for that reason and giving effect to both 
statutes that July 12, 1951 would be that date. 
"MR. ALSTON: Is that for the determination 
of damages? 
"THE COURT: Yes. That would be for the de-
termination of dam~ges and I presume that is really 
the only thing that is at issue here. 
"MR. ALSTON: Well, I hate to labor the issue. 
Your Honor. I am trying to find out if Your 
Honor is giving an order that the act, Chapter 75, 
Laws of 1951, as amended by Chapter 13, Laws 
of 1951, Special Session, is an act of condemnation? 
"THE COURT: Yes, I have·so ruled on that. 
Now you have asked me when did it take effect and 
my answer as to that is that July 12, 1951, would be 
the effective date. ' 
"MR. ALSTON: May the record show that the 
plaintiff takes exception to the order of the Court? 
"THE COURT: Yes. The record may so show." 
This Court should be aware of two further facts. It 
clearly appears from the record that the Engineering Com-
mission does not intend physically to close Kennedy Drive 
unless ordered to by the courts (R. 86). It is fair to say that 
all parties made arguments on that assumption and that the 
lower court made its ruling on that assumption. 
It also appears that during the trial of the damage issue 
for the taking of Parcel 28; owned by the Deere Estate, it 
was stipulated between counsel for the trustees of Deere 
Estate and counsel for the Engineering Commission that 
for purposes of that trial Kennedy Drive would not be con-
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sidered · closed, the right of the trustees to proceed for fur-
ther damages in the event of such closure being reserved 
(R. 75). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM IS ACTUALLY A 
COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM AND AS 
SUCH IS BARRED BY RULE 13 (a), U. R. C. P. 
POINT II. 
THE STATUTE WAS NOT, IN AND OF IT-
SELF, A LEGISLATIVE CONDEMNATION OF 
KENNEDY DRIVE BECAUSE 
(A) THE LANGUAGE USED AND THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES NEGATE ANY SUCH 
INTENT. 
(B) THERE NEVER HAS BEEN A DE-
TERMINATION THAT PARK USE IS A 
MORE NECESSARY PUBLIC USE THAN 
USE AS A PUBLIC WAY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM IS ACTUALLY A 
COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM AND AS 
SUCH IS BARRED BY RULE 13 (a), U. R. C. P. 
The record shows that this case was commenced and 
summons served on July 11, 1951, and that defendant, Bird 
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& Evans, Inc., was one of the original defendants. Bird & 
Evans, Inc., owned the tract designated Parcel 7 in the; 
complaint. As defendant, it filed an answer to the com-
plaint and thereafter a trial before a jury was had on 
November 26 and 27, 1951. A verdict for $66,000 was rend--
ered and judgment entered thereon; the judgment was paid 
and a final order of condemnation was entered on March 21, 
1952. Not until April 1, 1952, did defendant file the plead-
.. ing entitled "cross-complaint" which is the subject matter-
of the intermediate appeal now before this court. 
Although this document is entitled cross-complaint, it 
is no more than an ordinary counterclaim subject to the new 
Rules of Civil Procedure as to counterclaims. Plaintiff's 
contention is that it was filed too late. 
Rule 13 (a) reads as follows: 
"A pleading shall ,state as a· counterclaim any 
claim which at the time of serving· the pleading 
the pleader has against any opposing party, if it 
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is 
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and 
does not require for its adjudication the presence 
of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire 
jurisdiction, except that such a claim need not be so 
stated if at the time the action was commenced the 
claim was the subject of another pending action." 
" 
We believe that the cross-complaint filed by defendant 
is squarely covered by this rule. Under defendant's theory· 
of the case, the taking of all monument lands was effectu-
ated by the passage of the statute. That was the "transac-
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tion or occurrence" which was the subject matter of plain-
tiff's complaint; all of defendant's claims arose at that 
time. The adjudication. of the claim does not require the 
presence of third parties over whom the court cannot 
acquire jurisdiction, defendant having demonstrated this 
by its insistence that Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County 
be joined. And there was no other action pending. The 
Rule is drafted in broad language, so as to include "any 
claim," and defendant does not escape the operation of the 
Rule simply by mis-labelling its pleading as something other 
than a counterclaim. It plainly is not a cross-complaint. 
Since adoption of the New Rules, one case has dealt 
with Rule 13 (a), Slim Olson, Inc. v. Winegar, (Utah 1952) 
246 P. 2d 609. That was a suit on open account for gas, oil 
and supplies delivered over a four-month period. The de-
fendant invoked Rule 13 (a) because of a prior separate 
action instituted by Winegar against the plaintiff therein 
for negligence in installing an oil sump. This court said: 
"Anent defendant's contention that all items of 
the open account should have been pleaded as a 
compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13 (a) in de-
fendant's negligence suit against Olson, it is ob-
vious that the $11.06 charged for parts used in in-
stalling the oil sump is the only item that arose 'out 
of the transaction or occurrence' the subject matter 
of defendant's negligence claim against Olson. The 
latter having failed to plead the item as a counter 
claim in such action is precluded from including it 
here, or in any other action, as is held by the author-
ities interp1·eting the rule6 (Italics added) . 
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(Footnote 6 of the court's opinion reads: "Ake 
v. Chancey, 5 Cir., 149 F. 2d 310; Pennsylvania R. 
Co. v. Musante-Phillips, Inc., D. C., 42 F. Supp. 340; 
1 Barron & Holtzoff, Fed. Prac. and Procedure, Sec. 
394.") 
Plaintiff therefore urges that, under defendant's theory 
of the case, the claim herein arose out of the same transac-
tion or occurrence which gave rise to its claim on account 
of the taking of Parcel 7. This claim, not having been 
pleaded at the time of the answer claiming damages for 
Parcel 7, is therefore barred. 
POINT II (A) 
THE STATUTE WAS NOT, IN AND OF IT-
SELF, A LEGISLATIVE CONDEMNATION OF 
KENNEDY DRIVE BECAUSE 
(A) THE LANGUAGE USED AND THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES NEGATE ANY SUCH 
INTENT. 
The lower court ruled that the statute (Sec. 63-11-10, 
U. C. A. 1953) by its own operation and without any further 
proceedings, constituted a condemnation of Kennedy Drive. 
The result, the court held, was that the fee simple under-
lying this street was taken from the City and tha~ the pub-
lic easement for passage was extinguished. 
It may be admitted that proceedings taken by state of-
ficers pursuant to a statute may so hamper a land-owner in 
his enjoyment of property that a "taking" is the result. 2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd Ed., § 6.1 [1]. It ap-
pears from the record however that there never has been in 
fact any physical closure of the road. Defendant does not 
base its claim upon an actual appropriation or upon any 
physical dealings with the Drive or with defendant's land. 
The taking of Kennedy Drive, defendant says, occurred as 
soon as the statute became law. The taking was by opera-
tion of law, entirely on paper. Plaintiff contends that the 
statute alone could not possibly so have operated. 
It is said in a recent text, 2 Nichols on Eminent Do-
main, 3rd Ed., §6.13: 
"The mere passage of legislation authorizing 
the acquisition of property by eminent domain is 
ordinarily not sufficient in and of itself to constitute 
a taking [Citations]. Where, however, the pro-
visions of the statute and the circumstances under 
which the appropriation is to take pla.ce are such as 
to indicate that the purpose of the law was to effect 
a taking by virtue of the statute itself, it has been 
held that a statute may be so construed as to vest 
title in the condemnor upon the mere passage of the 
law" [Citations]. 
The reason why legislation alone does not ordinarily 
operate as a taking has been set forth by the U. S. Supreme 
Court in Danforth v. United States, 308 U. S. 271, 84 L. 
Ed. 240, 60 S. Ct. 231. In that case, land was taken for a 
flood-way to relieve pressure on levees along the Mississippi 
River in high-water times. The legislation involved was the 
Flood Control Act of 1928 (33 U. S. C. A. §§ 702a - 702m, 
704), which, in effect, put Congressional approval upon 
plans and maps submitted by the Army Engineers. Among 
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the points i~ the case was a contention by Danforth that the 
taking occurred at the time the Act was passed. The simi-
larity of Danforth's arguments with those advanced by de-
fendant herein should be noted. The court said ( 84 L. Ed., 
.at 246 and 247) : 
"Petitioner seeks interest on the judgment from 
the time of the taking or appropriation of the flow-
age easement. Petitioner fixes this appropriation 
at the time of the enactment of the Flood Control 
Act of May 15, 1928, on the theory that the passage 
of that act diminished immediately the value of this . 
property because the plan contemplated the ultimate 
use of the floodway. Alternatively the date of the 
_ taking is fixed by petitioner as of October 21, 1929, 
when work began on the set-back levee or October 31, 
1952, when the set-back levee was completed." 
* * * * * 
"This leaves for consideration the contention 
that there was a taking by the enactment of the legis-
lation, when work began on the set-back levee or 
when that levee was completed. The mere enact-
ment of legislation which authorizes a condemnation 
of property cannot l;le a taking. Such legislation may 
be repealed or modified, or appropriations may 
fail." 22 
(The Court's footnote 22 reads: "Willink v. 
United States, 240 U. S. 572, 60 L. Ed. 808, 36 S. 
Ct. 422; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 596, 42 L. 
Ed. 270, 290, 17 S. Ct. 966; United States v. Sponen-
barger, this day decided [308 U. S. 256, 60 L. Ed. 
230, 60 S. Ct. 225] .") 
The soundness of the rule laid down in the Danforth 
case is most aptly illustrated by the action of the 1953 
legislature in expressly declaring Kennedy Drive and State 
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Route 65 not to be included as lands which the Engineer-
ing Commission was instructed to condemn. 
It is to be noted that t.he language of the U. S. Supreme 
Court is that legislation authorizing condemnation "cannot 
be a taking." The present case does not, of course, require 
a holding that a legislative act of condemnation is an im-
possibility ; the only holding required on these facts is that 
~ . 
this particular enactment did not operate as such. A read-
ing of the statutes pursuant to which the complaint herein 
was filed shows it to be very unlikely that the legislature 
thought of its action as constituting a taking. 
The act of the general session (Sec. 8, Ch. 75, L. '51) 
"granted the power" to proceed, the commission being in-
structed to include all of a described tract plus whatever 
other land in the vicinity it should deem appropriate. 
Amended language inserted at the special session (Sec. 
1, Ch. 13, L. '51, 1st S. S.) altered the enactment from a 
mere grant of power tQ an explicit command to proceed 
"forthwith." The land described in the amendment remains 
the same: the described tract plus whatever other land 
should be deemed appropriate. Presumably, the lower court 
read the change of language as constituting a change of 
legislative attitude from one of permission to one of com-
mand, and it must be admitted that the general tone of the 
language in the two statutes differs. But a reading of the 
altered language as expressing a legislative determination 
to appropriate Kennedy Drive back to its former wild state 
as park land so as to deny the existing public easement for 
travel, is somewhat extravagant; and defendant must go 
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even further so as to contend that the legislative intent was 
that the transformation occur right at the time of the 
passage of the act. 
The first act was merely a grant of power to proceed, 
which implies discretion in the commission as to the period 
of time within which action had to be taken. The second 
statute became an explicit instruction to proceed "forth-
with." That word means: "Immediately; without delay; 
hence, within a reasonable time ; promptly and with reason-
able dispatch." (Webster's New International Dictionary, 
2d Ed., unabridged.) If any legislative intention is evi--
denced by the· change of language, it is that the legislature 
did not want any delay about the setting up of the park. 
The altered language is indicative only of an intent to get 
the project moving. The commission was directed, in effect, 
to make up its mind as to what lands should be included 
within the park boundaries and then to proceed promptly 
to acquire them. 
There are obvious difficulties standing in the way of 
the interpretation which defendant would put upon the 
statute. Delegated to the commission was a discretionary 
power to condemn additional appropriate land in the vicinity 
of the park. It is puzzling to conceive how these additional 
lands, the whereabouts of which were not decided upon 
when the act was passed, could have been taken by the 
legislature. Defendant's position is such that it must assert 
the theory that the legislative intent was to effectuate a 
taking at that time of land even though the legislature did 
not know where the land was. The unlikelihood of the no--
tion appears from a mere statement of it. 
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There is another difficulty with defendant's concept: 
Whatever the legislature intended with respect to Kennedy 
Drive was also necessarily intended for the main state high-
way to Henefer, Route 65. The highway, as appears from 
the map, passes through the center of the park. The de-
scribed tract includes a segment of the highway as well as 
a segment of Kennedy Drive, and it clearly appears from the 
later passage of S. B. No. 86 that the two roads have always 
been thought of alike. If the statute closed Kennedy Drive 
then it also closed the main state highway. No other con-
clusion is possible. To· argue that the legislature intended 
to close up the state highway and to forbid motorists to 
drive through it is to attribute to the legislature intentional 
folly. Legislative intent is often elusive, but plaintiff feels 
that at least it is safe to attribute to the legislature the lack 
of any intent to deny the public right to pass along a main 
.state highway. 
There is much authority holding that courts will not 
impose upon a statute a construction which yields an un-
reasonable or absurd result. 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, §§ 377, 
·378. The statute here involved is silent as to whether it was 
intended to be presently operative as a taking, and such in-
tention ought not to be read in by implication, as was done 
below. 
POINT II (B) 
THE STATUTE WAS NOT, IN AND OF IT-
SELF, A LEGISLATIVE CONDEMNATION OF 
KENNEDY DRIVE BECAUSE 
(B) THERE NEVER HAS BEEN A DE-
TERMINATION THAT PARK USE IS A 
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MORE NECESSARY PUBLIC USE THAN 
USE AS A PUBLIC WAY. 
A familiar principle in the law of eminent domain is 
that land already in public use cannot be condemned and put 
to a different public use unless the new use is more neces-
sary. The rule has been incorporated into the law of our 
state by Sec. 78-34-4 (3), U. C. A. 1953, which reads: 
"Before property can be taken it must appear: 
* * * (3) if already appropriated to some pub-
lic use, that the public use to which it is to be applied 
is a more necessary public use." 
Another basic principle is that the question of what 
constitutes a public use is judicial and not legislative. 
/ "Although the legislature in the fi1"St ~nstance 
has the power to determine the question of public 
use [citations], it has no power to determine finally 
the extent of its own authority over private prop-
erty, and the question whether a use for which the 
legislature has authorized the taking of property 
· by eminent domain is really public is ultimately a 
judicial one" [citations]. 2 Nichols on Eminent Do-
main, § 7.4. 
The latter principle is expressed by Utah statute, see 
Sec. 78-34-8 (1), U. C. A. 1953, and by case law. In Town 
of Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P. 2d 343, this court 
said: 
"Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Sec. 7333, provides, 
'Before property can be taken it must appear; 1. 
That the use to which it is to be applied is a use 
authorized by law; 2. That the taking is necessary 
to such use.' And in section 7338, 'The court ·or 
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judge thereof shall have power: 1. To determine the 
conditions specified in Sec. 7333.' Whether the prop-
erty is being taken for a use authorized by law, that 
is, a public use, is by statute in this state, and by the 
general rule of law, a judicial question and may be 
inquired into by the courts." 4 McQuillin on Muni-
cipal Corporations (2d Ed.) 366; 10 R. C. L. 29. 
It follows from reading these two principles together 
that it is a judicial problem to determine which of two 
public uses is more necessary. This conclusion is expressed 
in our statutes. 78-34~8 (1) U. C. A. 1953 provides: 
"The court or judge thereof shall have power: 
( 1) to determine the conditions specified in Sec. 
78-34-4; * * * " 
Section 78-34-4, subsection 3, is the statute which pro-
vides that land devoted to a public use cannot be appropri-
ated for a different public use unless the new use is more 
necessary. 
In other words, the assertion that one public use is 
more necessary than another is one that can be made with 
legal finality only by the courts. As a consequence the 
legislature was simply without power to pass a statute hav-
ing the final legal effect of appropriating Kennedy Drive 
from a public street and making it over into a portion of a 
public park. Even had the statute contained express lang-
uage so asserting, the taking could not have occurred when 
defendant says it did. 
A holding that the legislature was entirely without 
power to appropriate Kennedy Drive is not the only way 
for thi& court to dispose of this case. Such a holding would 
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be sound legally. But an alternative solution of the prob-
lem would be the recognition that, entirely aside from any 
question of power, there was no actual intent by anyone 
involved to taken Kennedy Drive. 
The Engineering Commission's· resolution contained no 
declaration that park use is more necessary than road. use; 
the complaint, and even the cross-complaint, contained no 
such allegation ; the lower court made no such finding. 
And the legislature was silent with respect to any declara..:. 
tion that park use is the more necessary (at least there was 
silence until S. B. No. 86 declared to the contrary). To at-
tempt to distill out of that silence an implied, conscious, 
"legislative intention" so to declare (as defendant must in 
order to succeed) is to pursue an illusion. For, . in simple 
fact, there was not a "legislative intention" with respect to 
Kennedy Drive one way or another. The existence of the 
roads involved in this case and the effect upon them of the 
passage of the act was something that the legislature, or the 
legislators, just did not thirik about, until 1953. 
If that is so, and plaintiff respectfully urges that any 
other conclusion would not be realistic, then the error of 
the lower court becomes obvious. The legislature not only 
lacked power to assert with finality that Kennedy Drive 
was taken for a more necessary public use; the legislature 
did not even attempt to make the assertion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff rests its case on these deductions from prin-
ciples of law set forth in the argument: 
Defendant came to court too late, its claim being one 
which under the Rules had to be pleaded as a compulsory 
counterclaim in the original answer demanding compensa-
tion for the taking of Parcel 7. 
If the case be treated on the merits, defendant is also 
barred. The theory upon which defendant proceeded is un-
sound because there is ascribed to the legislature an "in-
tent" it never had, and because the "intent" was one which 
the legislature was powerless to effectuate even had it de-
sired to. The legislature did not consciously intend, by the 
statute alone, to take Kennedy Drive. And it did not intend 
any declaration that park use of the land under the street 
is more necessary than use as a public way. Finally, even 
had the legislature so intended, and so declared, there is no 
legislative power to do what defendants says has been done. 
The legislature did not want to take Kennedy Drive and, 
acting alone, could not have done so had it wanted to. 
The lower court's ruling should be reversed, and the 
case should be remanded with instructions to dismiss. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General 
ROBERT B. PORTER, .JR., 
Assistant A ttoTney General 
JOHN W. HORSLEY, 
Assistant Attorney General 
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